

# Investor Attention in Opaque Muni Markets


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# Overview of empirical results

- Muni investors respond slowly to value-relevant information.
- Muni investors rely on credit ratings for information.
- Muni bond insurance loses value after financial crisis.
- Credit ratings (imperfect) substitute for (lost) AAA insurance.
- Municipal rating analysts spread thin; ratings correlate with fees.
- Municipal ratings less subject to conflicts of interest.
- Municipal ratings more accurate historically than other asset classes.
- Municipal ratings subject to analyst home bias.

# Muni investors respond slowly to value-relevant information.




- December 2007: MBIA DD=1.10 implies PD  $\sim$  9%. Moody's corporate bond PD table suggests Caa2; 17 notches lower than affirmed Aaa.
- June 2008: Moody's downgrades to A2.
- June 2009: Moody's downgrades to Ba3.



Figure 3: Time series of cumulative bond returns 2006-2009



# Muni investors rely on credit ratings for information.

- Moody's 2010 scale recalibration overcomes endogeneity problems to identify a causal impact of ratings on bond prices.
- Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) reveal investor reliance on ratings in secondary markets.




# Muni bond insurance loses value after financial crisis.

- Comprehensive data: 400,000 issues over 30 years with data on issuers, insurers, issue characteristics including the time series of changes in underlying credit quality.
- Selection models control for fundamentals and the endogenous choice to insure.



# Credit ratings (imperfect) substitute for (lost) AAA insurance.

- High credit quality issuers don't need to buy credit enhancement, nor do they need to compensate rating agencies for higher ratings.
- Issuers who lose the ability to insure are more likely to compensate rating agencies.





**Municipal rating analysts spread thin; ratings correlate with fees.**

## Farmer's Branch, TX

Issue Date	May 7, 2013
Issue Size	\$6.5 Million
Issue Security	Tax Backed

	Moody's		S&P
Rating Fee	\$7,150	<	\$12,000
Rating	Aa2	<	AA+


## Frisco, TX

Issue Date	July 16, 2013
Issue Size	\$6.5 Million
Issue Security	Tax Backed

	Moody's		S&P
Rating Fee	\$13,600	>	\$5,750
Rating	Aa1	>	AA

# Municipal ratings less subject to conflicts of interest.

- Muni ratings least lucrative asset class.
- Disclosure should mitigate conflicts. Texas mandates fee disclosure, by agency.
- Aaa is the plurality rating from both Moody's, S&P, & Fitch and is among the cheapest.






# Municipal ratings more accurate than other asset classes.

Cumulative distributions of default: For each rating, divide the number of defaulting bonds by the number of bonds rated on January 1.

Accuracy ratios measure the area between this distribution and the diagonal line.



# Municipal ratings subject to analyst home bias.

- Example: Bonds issued by the City of La Crosse, WI.
  - S&P analyst SSN: 390-XX-XXXX
    - 387-399 → Wisconsin
    - Bachelor's from Univ. of Wisconsin-Green Bay
    - S&P Rating: AA
  - Moody's analyst SSN issued in Washington, DC.
    - Moody's Rating: A1
  - AA is 2 notches above A1.
- Result robust in regression framework controlling for rating agency fixed effects and bond-month fixed effects.
  - CRA FE control for differences in rating standards and methodologies
  - Bond FE control for issuer fundamentals and issue characteristics.
  - Month FE control for credit market and macroeconomic conditions.



# Conclusions

- Investors rely on credit ratings for information in the opaque muni bond market.
- Muni analysts subject to home bias, but muni ratings historically more accurate than other asset classes.
- Ratings correlated with fees likely reflect increased due diligence among formerly insured bonds.
- Credit rating fee disclosure improves transparency and mitigates conflicts of interest.
- Standardized CAFR reporting in machine-readable format may improve the informational efficiency of these markets.

# References

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